Abstract
In this paper, I show that persistent pricing anomalies are consistent with a market that includes ambiguity averse investors. In particular, I show that ambiguity averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Because the aggregate signals preferred by ambiguity averse investors are not sufficient statistics for the components from which they are constructed, equilibrium prices may fail to impound publicly available information. This provides opportunities for investors whose preferences satisfy the Savage (1954) axioms to generate profitable trading strategies since they are neutral to ambiguity. Ambiguity averse investors perceive that the benefit of using aggregate signals outweighs the costs of trading against investors who have superior information. The model can explain both under-reaction such as that evident in post-earnings announcement drifts and momentum and over-reaction to accounting accruals.
JEL Classification: D81, G11, G14
This study examines how the aggregation of information affects equity prices when some investors are ambiguity averse while others have preferences that satisfy the Savage (1954) axioms (hereafter Savage investors).
1 Ambiguity aversion refers to a distaste for uncertainty about the joint distribution of informative signals and security payoffs. 2 I demonstrate that ambiguity aversion can cause investors to prefer aggregate information even when the aggregate signal is not a sufficient statistic for its components and therefore entails a loss of information in a Blackwell (1953) sense. Whereas Savage investors weakly prefer an aggregate signal only if it is a sufficient statistic for its components, ambiguity averse investors are willing to trade sufficiency for a reduction in ambiguity. It is possible for aggregate signals that deviate from sufficiency to provide greater reductions in ambiguity than those that do not. As a consequence, ambiguity averse investors' preference for aggregate information implies that equilibrium prices may fail to impound public information.
I model an exchange economy in which investors observe informative signals prior to trading shares in a firm and a riskless asset. I examine two information regimes. I first model an economy in which all investors view the same aggregate signal that is a linear combination of two components. I then model an economy in which investors select whether to view an aggregate signal or its components. The structure of the model allows for an aggregate signal that is a sufficient statistic for inferring the firm's terminal dividend and thus entails no loss of information relative to viewing the components. I treat the sufficient statistic as a benchmark case and demonstrate that ambiguity averse investors prefer an aggregate signal that is a non-sufficient statistic if a reduction in ambiguity adequately compensates for a loss in information due to non-sufficiency.
The impact of the ambiguity averse investors' preference for aggregate information provides an alternative explanation of several pricing anomalies to those presented in the literature to date. In my model, prices fail to fully impound public information so that an econometrician may observe apparent mispricing. Prices in my model underreact to overall news, consistent with several anomalies such as the post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989,1990 ) and long-run abnormal returns following corporate announcements. 3 I further show that, while prices underreact to overall news, prices overreact to some components of the aggregate signal.
The overreaction to signal components provides a potential explanation for the accrual anomaly in which prices apparently overreact to the non-cash portion of profits and underreact to the cash portion (Sloan 1996) . Some researchers (e.g Sloan 1996) attribute the anomaly to a difficulty in interpreting non-cash earnings, which is inconsistent with my model since this would cause prices to underreact to non-cash earnings. On the other hand, more recent work (e.g Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn 2003, Zhang 2007) provides evidence that the anomaly arises due to a relation between growth and non-cash earnings. My model is consistent with this second view given that growth presumably represents a relatively ambiguous component of firm value for which prior distributions may be highly subjective. In such cases, ambiguity averse investors prefer aggregate information with a heightened sensitivity to news about the ambiguous component of firm value and prices therefore overreact as in the accrual anomaly.
These mispricing effects still occur in the second information regime in which investors select whether to view an aggregate signal or its components. I show that ambiguity aversion behaves similarly to an information acquisition cost and may cause ambiguity averse investors to prefer to view an aggregate signal that is not a sufficient statistic notwithstanding a loss of information. In this setting, equilibrium prices fail to fully reflect public information so that Savage investors, who utilize all available in-3 See Barberis and Thaler (2003, Section 5) for several examples.
formation, earn abnormal profits. 4 Because a deliberate choice rather than a mistake (correctable through Bayesian updating) causes this result, it provides a possible explanation for the persistent profitability of trading strategies that rely on costless public information.
The benefit from aggregate information arises because ambiguity averse investors tend to view ambiguous information with skepticism. Blending signals that have varying degrees of ambiguity produces an averaging effect whereby investors face less ambiguity when basing their investment decisions on a non-sufficient aggregate signal than when they base decisions on the aggregate signal's components. I show that ambiguity averse investors are sensitive to the proportion of signal variation due to ambiguity. Aggregating signals can reduce the proportional impact of ambiguity and therefore reduce ambiguity averse investors' skepticism.
Whether an aggregate signal reduces ambiguity depends on the nature of the distortion from a sufficient statistic relative to the source of ambiguity. When ambiguity primarily relates to difficulty in interpreting information, ambiguity averse investors prefer aggregate information with a dampened sensitivity to ambiguous signals. On the other hand, when ambiguity primarily pertains to prior beliefs, ambiguity averse investors prefer aggregate signals with a heightened sensitivity to signals of ambiguous components of the firm's value. I refer to the latter case as ambiguity in fundamentals and the former as ambiguity in information. Other forms of aggregation, such as heightening sensitivity to difficult to interpret information, can exacerbate ambiguity and therefore would likely be ignored by ambiguity averse investors when they have access to alternative sources of information.
Testing the model's predictions requires a proxy for ambiguity. Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2006) propose the use of disagreement among forecasters to measure ambiguity at a macroeconomic level. One could apply similar arguments to utilize forecast dispersion as a measure of firm-level ambiguity. Indeed, this approach closely resembles that utilized by Zhang (2006) and Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) who find an association between pricing anomalies and proxies for information uncertainty.
Broadly speaking, this paper contributes to the capital markets literature by showing that the manner in which information is aggregated may affect prices. Prior research has suggested that more information reduces capital costs. For example, Easley and O'Hara (2004) , Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2006) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2006) show that the equity premium decreases in response to increases in the average precision of investors' posterior beliefs about security payoffs. This literature primarily assumes that the market includes only Savage investors who, by the Blackwell (1953) theorem, prefer as fine of an information set as possible. As stated above, I show that aggregate information in the form of a non-sufficient statistic can reduce the equity premium.
The reduction in the equity premium differs from what would obtain in a market comprise solely of Savage investors with information processing costs. Aggregating information in a manner that departs from statistical sufficiency would be detrimental in a market with only Savage investors. Furthermore, other studies have shown that, holding the total information available to investors constant, information asymmetry increases the equity premium. I show that this result need not hold when the market includes ambiguity averse investors. Firms can obtain a low equity premium by providing detailed information to Savage investors and summary information to ambiguity averse investors even though this increases information asymmetry.
In a concurrent study, Epstein and Schneider (2006) develop a model in which ambiguity averse investors process individual signals. They focus on a model of learning in which ambiguity aversion is characterized by Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) max-min expected utility and they do not address the topics of multiple signals and over-/underreaction that I emphasize in this study. Prior studies such as Dow and Werlang (1992) and Epstein and Wang (1994) have linked ambiguity aversion to the high equity premium noted by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2006) provide empirical evidence that ambiguity explains a significant portion of equity returns. Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) and Easley and O'Hara (2005) show that heterogeneous ambiguity aversion can lead to the limited market participation noted by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) . Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) also show that heterogeneous ambiguity aversion can yield a conglomerate discount even without considering agency problems. The results of my model add to an already large set of equity market phenomena that are consistent with ambiguity aversion.
Apart from its implications for market behavior, my finding that ambiguity averse investors prefer aggregate information also contributes to the literature on ambiguity aversion by providing a situation in which ambiguity aversion can be distinguished from a high degree of risk aversion. In many settings, ambiguity aversion appears to reflect a high degree of caution. Empirically, this may be difficult to distinguish from high risk aversion. In my setting, however, ambiguity averse investors focus on summary information, which is, in principle, an observable phenomenon.
5 Furthermore, risk aversion should induce rather than discourage the use of public information. If an observed tendency to focus on summary information were due to information processing costs, there is no apparent reason why investors would prefer distorted summary information such as that preferred by ambiguity aversion investors in my model. Lastly, my model provides a means by which decision makers can reduce exposure to ambiguity. Decision makers may not be able to control the underlying degree of ambiguity in their environment, but they can control how they package and process information.
5 One could directly determine information usage in an experiment or infer it from market reactions to different types of information.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the market and derives equilibrium prices. Section 2 demonstrates that aggregate signals can reduce ambiguity and provides conditions under which ambiguity averse investors prefer to view aggregate information. Section 2 also demonstrates that aggregate information can reduce equity premia and increase the holdings of ambiguity averse investors. Section 2 further shows that ambiguity aversion generates apparent violations of Milgrom and Stokey's (1982) no-trade theorem. Section 3 describes how the previous results differ when ambiguity pertains to fundamentals rather than information. Section 4 develops the main results of the paper and shows how ambiguity and the packaging of information affects price reactions to news. Section 5 concludes. I include proofs in the appendix. I model ambiguity averse preferences using Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji's (2005) representation of ambiguity aversion (smooth ambiguity aversion).
Model and Equilibrium
7 Given a set S of payoff relevant states and a set P of probability distributions, the preferences 6 See Easley and O'Hara (2005) for a model that includes Savage and ambiguity averse investors in an exchange economy in which investors do not view information prior to trade.
7 The advantages of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji's (2005) characterization over the earlier maxmin expected utility characterization developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) include tractability due to smooth indifference curves and a separation of tastes and beliefs. The separation of tastes and beliefs allows for Bayesian updating as in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2006) . Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji show that their characterization nests max-min expected utility as a special case of infinite ambiguity aversion. Gollier (2005) shows that smooth ambiguity aversion, like max-min expected utility, implies pessimism with regard to prior distributions. of decision makers can be represented by a utility function u, an increasing function h and a subjective probability measure Q over P. A decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if the following condition is satisfied, where E P [·] refers to the expectation with respect to the probability P :
If h is linear, the decision maker's preferences obey the Savage axioms because we can rewrite his expected welfare from act f as follows, where I have assumed h(E P [u]) = E P [u] without loss of generality:
The probability measure P * is defined by dP * (s) = P dP (s) dQ(P ).
A linear h implies therefore precludes ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion requires nonlinearity in h and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) show that a concave h yields ambiguity aversion as in the Ellsberg (1961) Prior to trade, investors observe an information set J ∈ {S, (s, p)} where S = s 1 s 2 , s is summary report that is a linear aggregation of S and p is the price of the firm's shares. In both cases, J is jointly normally distributed with the terminal dividend v. For the summary signal s, first consider the benchmark case s = E [v|S] . In this case, s is a sufficient statistic for S with respect to inferring the terminal dividend v.
9
I parameterize aggregate signals relative to the benchmark s = E [v|S] . The indepen-
The information content of the summary signal s depends solely on the relative coefficients 8 While I model e 1 as ambiguous and the remaining variables as purely risky, real economic situations rarely involve pure risk. The results pertaining to the ambiguous signal can be interpreted as referring to a relatively more ambiguous signal. Varying degrees of ambiguity might arise based on the nature of a given situation. For example, investors might have access to econometric models that provide an accurate depiction of the relation between a company's earnings and its ongoing operations but they may not know how announcements of investments in new technologies impact firm value.
9 To see this, note that var(v|s;
on s 1 and s 2 . I can therefore index linear aggregation schemes by the parameter λ as follows without loss of generality:
The parameter λ represents the degree to which the aggregate signal s incorporates am- Prior to trade, investors observe an information set J ∈ {S, (s, p)} and select a quantity of shares to maximize the following objective functions (See the Appendix for derivation):
Ambiguity averse : max
The Savage objective function (1a) is standard while the ambiguity averse objective
sents the degree to which residual uncertainty about v depends on the ambiguous factor b. If information J eliminates all ambiguity, then R(v, b|J) = 0 while R(v, b|J) = 1 implies that all residual uncertainty about v pertains to ambiguity. Savage investors price uncertainty about b through its impact on var(v|J) while the R(v, b|J) term appears in (1b) because the ambiguity averse investors require a greater premium to bear ambiguity than they require to bear pure risk. I define the following functions to represent posterior precision, where the ambiguity averse investors' precision r a (v|J) includes an adjustment for ambiguity:
The objective functions in (1) are concave in q so that the investors' first-order conditions yield the optimal demands q S for Savage investors and q A for ambiguity averse investors:
The equilibrium price depends on the investors information sets and the per capita Given the supply x and investors' information choices, the equilibrium price p * solves the following:
In order to reduce notation, I define the average precision and average expectation:
The following lemma establishes the existence of an equilibrium price and states the corresponding quantities held by investors.
Lemma 1.
There exists an equilibrium price p * such that:
where β s ∈ [0, 1] and equals 0 if investors are unable to view disaggregate information.
The equilibrium holdings given information J are:
The beliefs of investors who view (s, p) are as follows where
From the second equality in (5c), it is clear that ambiguity aversion attenuates the magnitude of ambiguity averse investors' holdings relative to Savage investors. The lower relative holdings of ambiguity averse investors resembles lower relative holdings of a set of investors with lower risk tolerance. Indeed, the same equilibrium price and holdings result from an assumption that fraction α of investors are Savage with risk tolerancē
while fraction 1 − α are Savage with risk tolerance ρ.
Despite the similarity between ambiguity aversion and high risk aversion, the two differ in how the nature of information affects them. In the case of an Savage investor with low risk tolerance, changes in information do not affect the relative holdings of the two investor types, which in the previous example would be the ratioρ/ρ of their risk tolerance coefficients. Any reduction or distortion of information increases the equity premium in this case, as well. Section 2 shows that neither of these results hold when some investors are ambiguity averse. Equation (5c) implies that when some investors are ambiguity averse, the relative holdings of the two investor types depends on the information set J. Also, while reductions in information can increase the equity premium by increasing the variances in the average precisionr, reductions in information can also yield an offsetting reduction in the ambiguity reflected by the term R(v, b|J) of the ambiguity averse investor's perceived precision r a (v|J).
Impact of ambiguity on preferences for aggregate information
In this section, I first demonstrate how aggregate signals can reduce ambiguity. I then show that aggregate signals may therefore yield lower equity premia than disaggregate information in a setting where all investors have the same information set. Finally, I
show in this section that ambiguity averse investors may prefer to view an aggregate signal even when they have access to disaggregate information and know that other investors will view the disaggregate information.
When analyzing the impact of aggregate signals on information, I focus on the cases of disaggregate information S and the aggregate signal s. The ambiguity term R (v, b|J) in the ambiguity averse objective function (1b) depends on three factors. The first factor is the square of the coefficient on b in E [v|J] . The second factor is a ratio of signal variances that represents to degree to which ambiguity contributes to uncertainty about signals. The third and last factor depends on investors' total posterior uncertainty.
Mathematically, we can decompose R(v, b|J) to reflect these effects:
var ( Table 1 illustrate the behavior of R(v, b|J) and r a (v|J) as the aggregation parameter λ varies. As previously noted, R(v, b|s; λ = 1) is always less than R(v, b|S) due to the averaging effect that the aggregate signal has on exposure to ambiguity. Figure Figure 1 shows that, as stated in Proposition 1, any λ < 1 yields lower ambiguity than setting λ = 1 while there is a range of λ > 1 for which the aggregate signal exacerbates ambiguity. In Figure 1 , any λ ∈ [0, 1] yields greater precision r a (v|s) than disaggregate information; however, this does not hold in general. While a λ ∈ [0, 1) always maximizes r a (v|s), under some parameterizations the cost of setting λ at extremely low levels offsets the benefit of ambiguity reductions. In such cases, disaggregate information will yield greater precision than aggregate signals with λ at or close to zero.
Proposition 1 implies the following results in a setting in which all investors have the same information set J ∈ {S, s}. Part (b) of Proposition 2 implies that aggregate information may reduce the equity premium relative to providing disaggregate information since the equity premium decreases in average precisionr. This contrasts with previous studies such as Lambert, 12 The market never totally excludes ambiguity averse investors in my model due to their smooth indifference curves versus the kinked indifference curves in the max-min expected utility used by Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005) and Easley and O'Hara (2005) . A similar result holds under max-min expected utility except that the ambiguous signal s 1 has unknown precision. The ambiguous signal can have an unknown mean, as well, but in the max-min expected utility characterization an unknown mean only affects the per capita supply level x at which ambiguity averse investors buy shares in the firm. Ambiguity averse participation does not depend on signal realizations and summarization unless the signal has unknown precision. In this case, there is a λ * > 0, possibly greater than 1, such that summary signals with λ ∈ [0, λ * ) guarantee greater market participation by ambiguity averse investors than with disaggregate information. mation, ambiguity averse investors face an information choice problem while the Savage investors will view the disaggregate information. Define the ambiguity averse investors' ex ante certainty equivalent c(J; θ A ) as the expected value of their certainty equivalent for the post-information round of trade given that they view information J ∈ {S, (s, p)}:
The post-information equilibrium price, and therefore c(J; θ A ), depends on the fraction θ A of ambiguity averse investors who view disaggregate information S. The three possible equilibria are:
• All ambiguity averse investors view S: θ = 1 and c(S) > c(s, p)
• Some ambiguity averse investors view S: θ ∈ (0, 1) and c(S) = c(s, p)
• No ambiguity averse investors view S: θ = 0 and c(S) < c(s, p) Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium information choice of ambiguity averse investors.
When few ambiguity averse investors view disaggregate information, some investors may find that the information advantage of viewing disaggregate information outweighs its costs in terms of exposure to ambiguity. When most view disaggregate information, prices are relatively informative so that ambiguity averse investors risk less by viewing only summary information.
The aggregate signal in Figure 2 has very little sensitivity (λ = 0.15) to the ambiguous component s 1 ; however, investors who view the aggregate signal s also glean information about s 1 from the price so that their information set's sensitivity to s 1 is greater than the aggregate signal's sensitivity to s 1 . From Lemma 1, we have E[v|s, p] =
. The sensitivity of E[v|s, p] to s 1 is therefore
. Since λ ∈ [0, 1) implies 
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The following proposition states that all ambiguity averse investors strictly prefer (s, p) to S in the benchmark case when the aggregate signal is a sufficient statistic. This result obtains regardless of the noise in prices due to random supply x.
Proposition 3. The following properties hold when investors can choose whether to view disaggregate information or a summary signal:
(a) All ambiguity averse investors strictly prefer the benchmark aggregate signal (λ = 1) to disaggregate information.
(b) There exists aλ ∈ [0, 1) such that some fraction of ambiguity averse investors, and possibly all ambiguity averse investors, strictly prefer summary signals with
Proposition 3 establishes that ambiguity averse investors may prefer to view a relatively less informative aggregate signal even though they know that Savage investors view disaggregate information. Furthermore, firms have an incentive to provide summary signals with relatively low sensitivity to ambiguous information since this lowers their equity premium. Note that ambiguity averse investors make their choice to view only summary information with a full awareness that other investors have viewed the disaggregate information. These investors therefore do not perceive that they are making a mistake so that this behavior may very well persist.
Ambiguity in fundamentals
The previous sections depicted a scenario in which investors face ambiguity in interpreting information but have a well defined prior belief for the distribution of payoffs.
In this section I show that summary information can also benefit situations in which investors face ambiguity only in their prior beliefs regarding payoffs. Whether ambiguity pertains more or less to fundamentals or information depends on the relative expertise of the investor and the characteristics of the information environment. For example, a situation with relatively low ambiguity in fundamentals but high ambiguity in information could correspond to a person that has a great deal of industry knowledge so that he has a well-defined prior belief about the firm's value. He may not have expertise in interpreting accounting information or discerning information provided by analysts. A situation with relatively low ambiguity in information could correspond to a person who has deep knowledge of how accounting information derives from firm value but lacks expertise to arrive at a well-defined prior belief about the firm's value.
I maintain the same setup as the previous sections but alter the information structure so that the distribution of the component v 1 of the terminal dividend is ambiguous. The distribution of the noise term e 1 in the signal s 1 = v 1 + e 1 is unambiguous. I assume that e 1 is normally distributed and independent of the other variables in the model. The averaging effect of summarizing information is present in the
term of (7b).
In the case of ambiguity in fundamentals, increases rather than decreases in λ reduce ambiguity. This can be seen in the term that subtracts the squared coefficient on b.
When investors face ambiguity about fundamentals, there may be no summary signal that completely shields investors from ambiguity. 15 Recall from the discussion of Proposition 2, when investors face ambiguity about information, a summary signal that sets λ = 0 may be optimal if ambiguity averse investors with extreme ambiguity aversion dominate the pool of investors. When investors face ambiguity about fundamentals, it may be impossible to deliver a summary signal such that R(v, b|s) = 0. This occurs because ambiguity does not result from the interpretation of signals but rather from investors' preexisting prior beliefs. In this setting, ambiguity averse investors prefer an aggregate signal with λ > 1 since they are relatively more concerned with learning about
More generally, an aggregate signal of the form s = E[v|S] will yield a lower exposure to ambiguity and larger ambiguity averse precision r a (v|J) than the disaggregate report S regardless of the number of ambiguous components of firm value or whether ambiguity 15 Technically, R(v, b|s) = 0 has no solution in λ ∈ R unless the noise in s 1 is sufficiently small relative to the noise in s 2 . Having a λ ∈ C makes no sense in the context of this model. 
Market reaction to news
Having established how investors respond aggregate information, I now analyze how aggregate information affects price reactions to different types of information. Section 2 showed that ambiguity averse investors prefer summary information with a dampened sensitivity to s 1 when ambiguity pertains to its noise e 1 , which represents uncertainty about how to link the signal s 1 to its corresponding fundamental v 1 . Section 3 discusses that ambiguity averse prefer summary information with high sensitivity to s 1 when ambiguity pertains to the fundamental v 1 . In both cases, therefore, ambiguity averse investors prefer summary information that is distorted relative to the benchmark E[v|S].
The ambiguity averse investors' preference for summary information causes prices to underreact to news. The derivation of equilibrium prices in Lemma 1, which did not depend on the value of the summary parameter λ, gives the equilibrium price:
If we define good news as E[v|S] > E[v], then the expected price given good news depends onE E[v|S]| E[v|S] > E[v] and E E[v|s]| E[v|S] > E[v]
. Direct computation shows the following:
The fraction
var(E[v|s]) var(E[v|S])
< 1 whenever λ = 1 so that the ambiguity averse investors' usage of distorted summary information (β 1 < 1) attenuates price reactions to news. 16 This result suggests that ambiguity aversion can yield underreaction phenomena such as the post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989, Bernard and Thomas 1990 ) and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) .
The underreaction to overall news does not hold when analyzing the individual signals s 1 and s 2 . When ambiguity averse investors view a distorted summary (λ = 1), prices overreact to one component of earnings and underreact to the other. Lemma 1 implies the following price coefficients on s 1 and s 2 in the equilibrium price:
The inequalities follow from direct computations that give λ cov(v, s)/ var(s) < 1 (> 1) for λ ∈ [0, 1) (> 1) and cov(v, s)/ var(s) > 1 (< 1) for λ ∈ [0, 1) (> 1). This suggests that prices underreact to signals that are difficult to interpret, as given by an ambiguous noise term e 1 , since ambiguity averse investors prefer a dampened sensitivity (λ < 1) to ambiguous signals in that case. Prices will tend to overreact to news about the ambiguous component of firm value v 1 when ambiguity pertains to fundamentals. This occurs because ambiguity averse investors have relatively greater concern with learning about v 1 and therefore prefer aggregate signals that emphasize the signal s 1 (λ > 1).
The price coefficients (8) show that efficient pricing may be unusual in a market with ambiguity averse investors. Researchers investigating market reactions to information effectively have access to the disaggregate information set S and may therefore observe apparent mispricing. The price coefficients (8) imply that cov(v − p, S) = 0 so that a regression of returns on information will indicate a misreaction to news.
I summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In markets where investors have access to disaggregate signals and some ambiguity averse investors prefer to view the aggregate signal, the following hold if the aggregate signal is not sufficient for the disaggregate signals (λ = 1):
(a) The equilibrium price underreacts to overall news E[v|S].
(b) If λ < 1, then the equilibrium price underreacts to s 1 and overreacts to s 2 and vice versa if λ > 1.
This cross-sectional result potentially relates to the accrual anomaly documented by Sloan (1996) in which high accruals tend to predict low subsequent returns and vice versa. Some studies claim that the anomaly arises from investors misjudging the relative persistence of the cash and accrual components of earnings (e.g. Sloan 1996) . Others provide evidence that the anomaly arises due to a relation between growth and accruals (e.g Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn 2003, Zhang 2007) . My model is consistent with the second view that the anomaly arises due to a relation between accruals and growth.
If the anomaly arose due to ambiguity in the accruals themselves, as in the persistence argument, then ambiguity averse investors would prefer summary information with a dampened response to accruals and prices would therefore underreact to accruals. On the other hand, growth relates to a firm's fundamentals. If investors perceive growth as a relatively ambiguous component of a firm's fundamental value and accruals provide (unambiguous) information on that component, ambiguity averse investors will prefer summary signals with heightened sensitivity to accruals. This will cause prices to overreact to accruals as in the accrual anomaly.
As I showed in Section 2, investors' choices of information sets give rise to situations in which some ambiguity averse investors do, indeed, view summary information in lieu of the disaggregate information S and yield the β s < 1 condition in (8). Their use of the summary signal distorts the price reaction to news and provides an opportunity to profit from processing S even though it is public information. As noted by Fama and French (2007) , when a group of investors fails to utilize some information, this creates an opportunity to create portfolios that earn positive abnormal returns.
The price reactions to summary signals create opportunities for 'hedge' strategies based on the relative magnitude of ambiguous and unambiguous news. The following proposition establishes that, in such cases, Savage investors indeed take relatively large positions based on the magnitude of news. These positions may not translate into a literal long/short strategy, though. Whether an investor takes a long or short position depends on the sign of E[v|J] − p as follows for the information sets S and (s, p):
The above equations show that investors who view S and (s, p) will tend to both take long positions when supply x is large. The investors who view (s, p) tend to take smaller positions when E[v|s] < E[v|S] and vice versa. The following proposition establishes the claim that investors who view S earn larger profits than investors who view (s, p).
Proposition 5. In markets where some ambiguity averse investors strictly prefer summary information, investors who view disaggregate information take relatively larger long (short) positions when the ambiguous signal reflects good (bad) news and, on average, earn superior profits.
The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the average profits of investors are proportional
The proof goes on to show that the average profits for investors who view the two information sets are:
The first terms in the above expressions reflect profits from information sets while the second terms reflect the equity premium. The profits of investors who view S exceed the 
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that ambiguity averse investors may prefer aggregate information and the pricing implications of that preference. Signals that summarize otherwise public information have no value in standard asset pricing models since they merely provide redundant information. I show that a summary signal can reduce exposure to ambiguity, but at the cost of reducing information content. Investors do not value such a tradeoff if they have fully rational preferences that satisfy the Savage axioms; however, I show that ambiguity averse investors value reductions in ambiguity and may prefer summary information.
I show that ambiguity averse investors may prefer to view summary information even when they have free access to disaggregate information. Ambiguity averse investors who select summary information face potential trading losses to investors who have viewed the disaggregate information; however, they benefit from a reduction in ambiguity. This result potentially explains the persistent profits to trading strategies that take advantage of an apparent tendency of investors to underreact to public information. Within the context of my model, fully rational investors can consistently profit as compensation for bearing ambiguity. These profits resemble Knight's (1921) claim that entrepreneurs earn profits for bearing ambiguity rather than for bearing risk.
This paper contributes both to the literature on capital markets and on ambiguity aversion. The capital markets literature primarily assumes fully rational investors.
This paper demonstrates the effects of relaxing that assumption by allowing for ambi-guity aversion. In addition to showing how ambiguity aversion can cause mispricing, I also show that ambiguity aversion can generate trading volume and that aggregate information can reduce the impact of ambiguity aversion on the equity premium and non-participation in the stock markets. My finding that ambiguity averse investors prefer summary information contributes to the literature on ambiguity aversion by providing a situation in which ambiguity aversion produces clearly distinct behavior from risk aversion. Tables   Table 1: Effect of summary signals on ambiguity This table illustrates the impact of summary signals on investors' inferences and on ambiguity as in Proposition 1. In the disaggregate case, investors view the vector S that includes both the ambiguous signal s 1 and the unambiguous signal s 2 . In the summary cases, investors view a single signal s of the form s = λ 
Disaggregate
Summary signals signals λ = 0.75 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 8 E [v|J] 0 Derivation of (1) The objective function of an ambiguity averse investor is:
The joint normality of v, J and b implies that the interior expectation is:
This gives:
The joint normality of E [v|J, b] and J then gives:
The identity var(x|y) = var(x|y, z) + var(E[x|y, z]|y) for jointly normally distributed random vectors x, y and z implies that the above expression simplifies to:
where R(v, b|J) = 1 − 
Proof of Lemma 1 Case 1 -Homogeneous information
When all investors view the same information set J, they can learn nothing from prices and the derivation of price and holdings follow from the market clearing condition:
The above condition yields p 
investors who view (s, p) form demand based on E[v|s, p] and r a (v|s, p). The market clearing condition in this case is:
After solving the above market clearing condition for p, the price can be determined by equating coefficients. It is convenient when deriving the price to work with E[v|s] rather than s itself because of simplifications in computing covariances.
The steps are as follows:
1. Solve for δ x /δ 1 : The ratio of the coefficient on x to the coefficient on E[v|S] equals 1/ρ (1−α)r(v|S)+αθ A ra (v|S) so that δ x /δ 1 does not depend on conjectured price coefficients.
2. Solve for δ 1 : Direct computation shows that the coefficient on E[v|S] depends on r a (v|ŝ, p) and cov(v,p|ŝ) var (p|ŝ) and that these depend on conjectured price coefficients only via δ x /δ 1 and δ 1 itself. Because the previous step showed that δ x /δ 1 does not depend on the conjectured price coefficients, this allows one to solve for δ 1 .
3. Solve for δ x : Since we now have δ x /δ 1 and δ 1 in terms of primitives, we can compute
4. Solve for δ 2 : Direct computation shows that δ 2 depends on r a (v|ŝ, p) and
, which we have in terms of primitives, and on
which depends on the ratio δ 2 /δ 1 . Substituting for δ 1 and solving for δ 2 then gives δ 2 . This process yields the equilibrium price:
This price corresponds to the conjecture with δ 0 = β x µ x , δ 1 = β s , δ 2 = 1 − β s and
Substituting back into E[v|s, p] and simplifying yields:
where k x = 1/ρ (1−α)r(v|S)+αθ A ra (v|S) equals the ratio of the price coefficients on E[v|S] and 
Proof of Proposition 1
We have the following decomposition of R(v, b|S) and R(v, b|s) from (6):
var ( Since R(v, b|s) and the above polynomial condition are continuous in λ, there must be a finiteλ such that R(v, b|s) > R(v, b|S) for λ ∈ (1,λ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of part (a) 
Proof of Proposition 3
First I derive the ambiguity averse ex ante utility using of the fact that for a variable X that is normally distributed conditional on Y , we have: Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 
